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ABSTRACT 
 
What are the factors that contribute to non-compliance with a  supply chain partner’s sustainability 
efforts? Based on institutional theory and social cognitive theory, a discrete-choice experiment was 
conducted with 128 U.S., 105 Brazilian and 109 Indian managers to test alternative causes of 
suppliers’ non-compliance. Results of regression modeling provide preliminary evidence to support 
the idea that managers’ cultural and institutional background influence the way they perceive 
compliance with the buyer firm’s sustainability practices and that certain positions in the supply chain 
influence their likelihood to not comply with them.  
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1 Introduction 
In a global supply chain, it can be challenging to monitor the practices of distant, 
sometimes remotely located suppliers. However, a firm’s reputation can be tarnished by its 
use of suppliers that fail to follow acceptable standards. For example, it is estimated that 45.8 
million people work in modern slavery (sweatshop) conditions worldwide (Walk Free 
Foundation, 2016). Not surprisingly, most live in countries that provide low-cost labor to 
produce goods for firms in developed economies. In India alone, an 18.4 million people work 
in modern slavery conditions. The failure to implement sustainable practices in the apparel 
industry is attributed to socially accepted practices, such as the “Sumangali Scheme”, which 
exploits young women in spinning and textile firms in the Tamil Nadu region, which supplies 
many global brands. Even though the Sumangali Scheme violates India’s labor laws and 
international employment standards, the exploited workers, their parents and relatives 
socially support it (Fair Labor Association & Solidaridad, 2012). The challenge is for 
researchers to investigate more deeply the reasons that lead a firm to fail to achieve 
compliance, by suppliers, with its sustainability standards.  
The Sustainable Supply Chain Management (SSCM) literature is based on the 
underlying – and oftentimes omitted – assumption that a firm can enforce suppliers’ 
compliance with its sustainability standards by coercion or cooperation (Gimenez & 
Tachizawa, 2012; Kumar & Rahman, 2015). Under the coercion paradigm, a firm enforces 
sustainability practices through its Supplier Code of Conduct (SCC), inspecting suppliers’ 
facilities, selecting suppliers based on certifications (e.g., ISO 14001) and by penalizing for 
implementing non-compliant practices (e.g., Porteous et al., 2015). Contrarily, under the 
cooperation paradigm, a firm develops a trust-based, collaborative, long-term relationship 
with its suppliers, motivating them to comply with its sustainability practices because the 
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suppliers “care” about the relationship and perceive the benefits of maintaining it (e.g., 
Vachon & Klassen, 2008).  
Nonetheless, both paradigms are limited, in several ways (see also Lund-Thomsen & 
Lindgreen, 2014). First, with few exceptions (e.g., Aßländer et al., 2016; Grimm et al., 2014; 
Wilhelm et al., 2016), studies based on these paradigms draw conclusions based on analysis 
of a buyer-supplier dyad (Carter & Easton, 2011; Grimm et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2016), 
which is a simplistic representation of an actual multi-tier global supply network (Mena et al., 
2013). In addition, more severe violations tend to take place in lower, rather than first-tier, 
suppliers (Wilhelm et al., 2016), less visible to the buyer firm. Moreover, researchers tend to 
ignore the existence of multiple institutional environments (Wilhelm et al., 2016), which 
generate conflicting prescriptions and unbalanced external pressures to adopt sustainability 
practices. Conflicting prescriptions result from a firm’s sustainability standards, which may 
disregard its suppliers’ local context, cultural beliefs and social norms, although they conflict 
with its standards (Egels-Zandén, 2007; Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014; Jiang, 2009a; 
Jiang, 2009b; Wilhelm et al., 2016). The latter, unbalanced external pressures, result from 
public opinion and other external stakeholders that do not differentiate a firm from its 
suppliers; thus, a firm is viewed as responsible for the implementation of sustainability 
standards in its entire supply chain (Grimm et al., 2014). However, a supplier located in a 
remote area of a developing country faces few external pressures to adopt sustainability 
practices, other than pressure exerted by firm. Finally, studies related to SSCM that focus on 
the firm level of analysis ignore the fact that decisions are made by managers who are likely 
to be unconsciously biased by personal factors (e.g., culture, values and emotions), and 
motivated by conflicting goals (Bendoly et al.; Carter & Easton, 2011; Croson et al., 2013). 
Empirical evidence considering the individual level of analysis (e.g. Kirchoff et al., 2016) 
shows how “reality bites” (Croson et al., 2013) when individual factors are not considered. 
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Due to these limitations we suggest that the SSCM literature is too optimistic about 
suppliers’ compliance with sustainability practices by suppliers. Suppliers’ willingness to 
implement such practices seems overstated, while the reasons for failing to implement them 
seem oversimplified, as mere “barriers” that can be overcome by coercion or collaboration 
(e.g., Kumar & Rahman, 2015). On the other hand, examples of human suffering caused by 
the lack of SSCM a in supply chain are numerous, such as Zara suppliers’ sweatshop 
practices in Brazil1 and the fatal fire involving a group of garment suppliers in Bangladesh2, 
among others.  
This research addresses the following research question: “What causes suppliers’ non-
compliance with a firm’s sustainability standards in global supply chains?”. Based on 
institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), our 
primary research objective is to test for institutional, organizational and individual causes of 
suppliers’ non-compliant behavior with a firm’s sustainability standards. Specifically, our 
intention is to analyze whether conflicting institutional elements, suppliers’ position in a 
supply chain and managers’ morality affect non-compliant behavior. Furthermore, since 
managers’ behavior is expected to vary across national cultures, our secondary research 
objective is to compare these causal relationships across managers with different cultural and 
institutional backgrounds. 
The next sections are organized as follows. The theory section bridges macro and 
micro concepts, drawing hypotheses from both institutional and social cognitive theories, in 
order to explain non-compliant behavior at the institutional, organizational and individual 
levels of analysis. The methodology section provides details about our methodological 
approach, which uses discrete-choice scenario experiments with repeated measures. The 
                                                
1The Guardian, 2011. “Zara Accused in Brazil Sweatshop Inquiry”. Available in: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/18/zara-brazil-sweatshop-accusation. 
2 New York Times, 2012. “Fatal Fire in Bangladesh Highlights the Dangers Facing Garment Workers”. 
Available in: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-kills-more-than-100-and-injures-
many.html. 
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results section presents the results of our hypothesis tests using regression analysis. In the 
discussion section, we compare expected and actual results, positioning how our empirical 
findings relate to the existent literature. We end with the conclusion section, which discusses 
limitations to the generalizability of our findings, opportunities for future research and 
contributions to literature and practice.  
2 Theoretical foundations 
The conceptual foundation for this research is developed at the institutional, 
organizational and individual levels, summarized in Figure 1. 
----------------------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here --------------------------------- 
2.1 Institutional level 
2.1.1 Neo-institutionalism 
Meyer and Rowan’s seminal paper (1977) marked the beginning of neo-
institutionalism, calling attention to the taken-for-granted legitimacy of “rational” formal 
structures of firms and their isomorphic compliance with those considered legitimate in a 
society. Organizational structures, they argued, are not only a result of rational imperatives 
and resource dependencies, but also a result of “rationalized myths”, which legitimate what is 
considered to be a rational goal and specific means for pursuing it (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 2008).  
Because this view assumes that a firm can survive over time only if it complies with 
these rationalized myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), neo-institutionalism has been widely used 
to explain why firms pursue sustainability practices (Carter & Easton, 2011). In the past, a 
firm was expected only to deliver economic performance. Expectations, however, have 
shifted to include environmental and social pressures that motivate a firm to pursue a “triple 
bottom-line” result (Elkington, 1997). According to neo-institutionalism, a firm that 
disregards the natural environment and disrespects its employees and the society they are part 
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of should not be able to survive. As a result, many firms implement sustainability practices, 
both in their own operations and in their supply chain (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Carter & 
Easton, 2011). 
2.1.2 Institutional complexity 
However, this view fails to explain why some firms or their suppliers deliberately 
decide to not implement sustainability practices (e.g. Kirchoff et al., 2016). Although early in 
the development of neo-institutionalism, a firm was seen as the passive recipient of 
institutional pressure that would always conform with the rationalized myths of its 
institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), this conception has been criticized 
because it fails to explain reality in certain contexts (Oliver, 1991). If conformity is the only 
response to institutional pressures, firms facing the same institutional environment should 
become homogenous over time. Moreover, assuming all firms are able to conform to all 
external pressures implies that there are no conflicting external pressures. Neo-
institutionalism developed, thus, to recognize such limitations (Oliver, 1991) and began to 
view a firm as an active agent interacting with its institutional environment. As a result, its 
responses to external pressure include not only isomorphism, but also compromise, 
avoidance, defiance, and manipulation of these institutional pressures.  
This new concept of “institutional complexity” (Raaijmakers et al., 2015) provides a 
foundation for understanding the implementation of sustainable practices in a supply chain. 
Different firms within a supply chain face conflicting institutional pressures. When a firm 
interprets the rationalized myths of its institutional environment, it translates what is 
considered legitimate in its society to generate policies and standards it expects its suppliers 
to follow. Sustainability practices are no exception: SCCs, certificates, and even the 
definition of what is considered “sustainable” are products of firms’ institutional environment 
(Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2016). However, because a firm and its 
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suppliers may not be embedded in the same institutional environment, the policies and 
standards that it develops can be in discordance with the suppliers’ institutional environment, 
generating institutional complexity. In such a context, according to neo-institutionalism, 
suppliers’ managers must decide whether to comply or not with the firm’s prescriptions. In 
the absence of conflicting institutional elements, however, compliance with the firm’s 
prescriptions should be facilitated. Thus, our first research hypothesis is: 
H1: Suppliers’ non-compliance with a firm’s sustainability standards is 
higher in the face of conflicting institutional elements in suppliers’ 
institutional environments than in the absence of them. 
 
2.2 Organizational level 
2.2.1 Multiple institutional environments in supply chains 
Considering that some firms and their suppliers may be embedded in the same 
institutional environment, it is important to understand situations in which conflicting 
institutional elements are expected. Although early neo-institutionalism theorists assumed 
that a firm faces two different environments (technical and institutional) that each pressure it 
differently, this challenges the understanding that legitimated institutional structures also 
define and constitute the technical environment itself (Scott, 2008; Scott & Meyer, 1983). As 
a result, the institutional environment is described as constituted of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements that are shared within a society. A particular institutional 
environment differs from another because of the differences their elements (Scott, 2001; 
2008).  
Regulative elements include rules, laws and organizationally-defined sanctions that 
allow legitimate firms to constrain and regularize behavior, enforcing compliance (Scott, 
2001). In the case of sustainability, a firm defines the rules its suppliers must follow in order 
to continue doing business with it. Suppliers, on the other hand, are inclined to follow rules 
that they believe are legitimate, if they think they are being monitored, or if they fear 
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punishment (Porteous et al., 2015). Values and norms, on the other hand, constitute 
normative elements, which prescribe roles that social actors can assume and legitimate the 
manners of the people assuming these roles (Scott, 2001). For example, normative elements 
may prescribe that a firm is responsible for implementing sustainability standards throughout 
its supply chains. Its suppliers, however, experience no pressure to implement such practices 
in their own operations because the same practices may be not be legitimate in their 
institutional environments. The Sumangali Scheme is an example of a social accepted 
practice that, in fact, pressures suppliers to go against sustainability practices (Fair Labor 
Association & Solidaridad, 2012). Finally, shared conceptions of social reality constitute 
cultural-cognitive elements, which shape the way humans symbolize and internalize social 
reality (Scott, 2001). A firm and its suppliers may differ in terms of the types of behavior, 
social action and social obligation each takes for granted. While child labor is a practice that 
cannot be conceived of in some cultures, in others it is considered a way to train and socialize 
children so that they will have a wage in the future (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). 
Because institutional elements are usually similar within similar geographical regions, 
the structure of a supply chain determines whether a firm and its suppliers are in the same 
institutional environment. If both are located in the same region of the U.S., for example, 
non-compliance with the firm’s sustainability practices is not expected to be explained by 
conflicting institutional elements. However, if the firm is located in the U.S. and its suppliers 
are located in India or Brazil, they are not in the same institutional environment and, 
therefore, suppliers’ non-compliance with the firm’s sustainability practices can be explained 
by conflicting institutional elements (e.g. Wilhelm et al., 2016). 
2.2.2 Supply chain configurations 
Our focus is supply chain configurations that are multi-tier, complex, fragmented, and 
geographically dispersed, which is typical of most global supply chains (Mena et al., 2013). 
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We restrict our analysis to firms and their suppliers that are located in different countries and 
embedded in different institutional environments with different institutional elements, in spite 
of being in the same supply chain. In this context, neo-institutionalism suggests that a firm 
will prefer to comply with pressures exerted by institutions, firms or other stakeholders that 
they depend on for resources or legitimacy, in the presence of different institutional pressures 
for compliance (Raaijmakers et al., 2015). In a multi-tier supply chain with multiple 
institutional environments, the extent to which suppliers are dependent on a firm’s resources 
and legitimacy should affect their compliance with its sustainability standards. We 
operationalized dependency as the position held by a supplier in a supply chain. In Mena et 
al.’s (2013) view of a traditional multi-tier supply chain, flows of materials, money and 
information are linear from lower to upper tiers. Accordingly, a firm is not directly connected 
with its second-tier suppliers, which are less dependent on its resources and legitimacy and, 
therefore, less likely to comply with its prescriptions, than first-tier suppliers would be. Thus, 
our second research hypothesis is: 
H2: Suppliers’ non-compliance with a firm’s sustainability standards is 
higher in second-tier suppliers than in first-tier suppliers. 
 
2.3 Individual level 
2.3.1 Social cognitive theory 
Conflicting institutional elements and suppliers’ position in the supply chain, 
nevertheless, may not be sufficient to explain suppliers’ non-compliance with a firm’s 
sustainability standards in a supply chain, since both the firm’s and the suppliers’ managers 
can be biased by internal factors that affect their decisions (Croson et al., 2013). Social 
cognitive theory provides a theoretical lens for analyzing how internal factors affect 
managers’ non-compliant behavior. In contrast with other psychological theories (Allport, 
1961; Cattell, 1966; Freud 1917; 1933; Skinner, 1953; 1969), it recognizes that personal 
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internal factors are in reciprocal interaction with environmental events and with people’s 
behavior in “triadic reciprocal causation” (Bandura, 1986), which is represented in Figure 2. 
----------------------------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here --------------------------------- 
In this triadic reciprocal causal relationship, managers’ non-compliant behavior is 
explained by the bidirectional interaction of their personal factors (e.g. culture, values and 
emotions) and the environment in which they are embedded (e.g. their influence in their 
organization and their organization’s position in a supply chain). A manager who is not 
concerned about sustainability (personal factor), for instance, may not be interested in, and 
may even act to undermine, the implementation of sustainability practices in his or her firm’s 
supply chain. On the other hand, if a manager has little influence in the choice of suppliers or 
the firm is highly dependent on a specific supplier (environmental factor), the manager’s 
willingness to implement sustainability practices may not be enough to cause suppliers’ 
compliance. Thus, managers’ behavior is restricted or supported by personal and 
environmental factors, and, at the same time, their behavior may alter both. 
2.3.2 Moral conduct, moral self, moral centrality and moral identity 
Since the goal of sustainability practices is to prevent harmful actions against society 
and the environment, modal conduct is a personal factor that can influence a manager’s 
intention to comply. Moral conduct, according to social cognitive theory, is both the ability to 
avoid causing harm to others and the power to act compassionately and with a sense of social 
obligation (Bandura, 1999b). It is internalized as a result of triadic reciprocal causation. 
People’s socialization sets the standard for their moral conduct because it is disseminated by 
legitimate institutionalized systems, such as families, the educational system and the mass 
media. Thus, individuals socialized in different cultures and institutional backgrounds are 
expected to internalize different models of moral conduct and standards of conduct (Bandura, 
1991). 
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Often referred as the moral self, this internalized model of moral conduct contains two 
elements: the having side (the values a moral person has) and the doing side (how a moral 
person acts). Not all people, however, attribute the same value to their moral self and some 
may attribute different value to each side. Moral centrality is the extent to which a person 
considers his or her internal model of moral conduct to be important in actions. It affects 
individuals’ decision-making and motivational states, their behavior and intended behavior, 
and the self-conscious emotions they experience. Moral centrality has been operationalized in 
a number of ways, although the most researchers attribute it to Aquino and Reed’s (2002) 
concept of “moral identity” (Jennings et al., 2015), which is used in this research to represent 
managers’ morality. We expect managers with high moral identity to be more likely to 
comply with a firm’s sustainability standards than those with low moral identity. Thus, our 
third research hypothesis is: 
H3: Suppliers’ non-compliance with a firm’s sustainability standards is 
higher if managers have low moral identity, rather than high moral 
identity. 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Discrete choice experiment 
An experimental vignette methodology was used to test the hypotheses in a discrete 
choice experiment with a mixed manipulation design and a post-experimental questionnaire. 
A discrete choice experiment is a type of decomposition method developed by McFadden 
(1974) and others. It has been widely used in microeconometric analysis of choice behavior 
and marketing research (McFadden, 2000; Swait & Louviere, 1993). Respondents are 
presented to a set of alternatives, called the “choice set”, and are asked to choose the 
alternative they consider to be the best (Louviere, 1988; Train, 2002). It captures 
respondents’ implicit choices, which may be hidden when they are directly asked about them 
(Aguinis & Bradley, 2014), assesses real-time decision processes (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014) 
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and avoids respondents’ (especially managers’) rhetorical answers (Priem et al., 2011). Based 
on random utility theory, discrete choice experiments assume that the respondents’ utility for 
each choice is unknown, but can be inferred from its observable portion and random error 
component (Louviere, 1984), as represented by Equation 1: !!"  =  !!" + !!",                                                        (1) 
where: !!"  = unknown utility a respondent ! obtains from the choice of alternative !, !!" = observable component of the unknown utility a respondent ! obtains 
from the choice alternative !, and !!" = random error component of the unknown utility a respondent ! obtains 
from the choice of alternative !. 
 
Because respondents maximize their utility in their choices, they will choose 
alternative ! if the utility they obtain from it is higher than the utility they would obtain from 
the choice of any other alternative !, considering a finite set of alternatives ! = 1,… , !. 
Expressing !!!  as a function of alternative ! ’s observable attributes and respondent !’s 
observable characteristics related to this alternative, discrete choice experiments allow 
decomposition of respondent !’s choice pattern into observable factors and their influence on 
the choice (Louviere, 1984; Train, 2002), as represented in Equation 2: !!" =  !′!!" ,∀!                                                         (2) 
where: !!"  = vector of observable attributes of alternative !  and observable 
characteristics of respondent ! !′s = unknown coefficients of such characteristics, statistically inferred by 
the researcher. 
 
3.2 Sample 
We collected data from U.S., Brazilian and Indian managers since one of the 
objectives was to compare suppliers’ non-compliance across cultures. The U.S., Brazil and 
India have different institutional environments regarding such practices. While the U.S. is the 
least vulnerable to modern slavery, India is the most vulnerable, with the greatest number of 
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people working in such conditions. Among developing countries, Brazil is the least 
vulnerable to modern slavery (Walk Free Foundation, 2016). 
The U.S. and Indian respondents participated online for convenience in data 
collection and to increase task realism, since they were able to answer the questionnaires in 
their “natural setting” instead of an artificial laboratory environment (Aguinis & Bradley, 
2014). Amazon Mechanical-Turk (M-Turk), which is an eLancing platform that allows users 
to request tasks from other users in exchange for compensation, was used to offer $1.00 per 
respondent for participating in this experiment. We controlled for IP addresses to prevent 
answers from outside the U.S. and India and to avoid duplicate respondents. In order to 
ensure reliability of the data, we included three attention checks and did not record data from 
respondents who failed any of them, allowed respondents to use a maximum of two hours to 
complete the task, and eliminated data from respondents who spent less than five seconds 
reading any module. Further, we only included questions for filtering M-turkers (e.g.: asking 
whether respondents were managers) after they had completed the questionnaires and 
compensated them no matter what their response was to the filtering questions, in order to 
prevent lyng in order to receive compensation. 
Data collection was done differently in Brazil because M-Turk and other eLancing 
platforms are barely used there, perhaps because the native language is Portuguese. We 
distributed questionnaires both by email and on paper. Data was collected on four college 
campuses that offer part-time graduate business courses for working managers. They were 
invited to participate in the experiment during class time, as well as outside the entrance to 
these campuses. Participation was voluntary and, in most cases, respondents were given a 
small compensation in exchange for their answers. 
Between October and November 2016, we collected data from 978 respondents, 
comprised of 402 Americans, 125 Brazilians and 451 Indians. However, most of those were 
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not managers and were, thus, not considered in the analysis. Removing non-manager 
respondents and unreliable answers, our final sample contained a total of 342 valid responses, 
being 128 Americans, 105 Brazilians and 109 Indians. 
3.3 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained a cover page, a small task before the main experiment to 
increase respondents’ involvement, a common module and three manipulation modules with 
a written stimulus, containing a first person vignette in the form of a dialogue between the 
respondents’ character and his or her boss, four choice sets after each manipulation module 
and a post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix I). Questionnaires were self-
administered in a single session (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002).  
3.3.1 Common module 
Respondents were asked to imagine themselves as a purchasing manager working for 
a firm in the apparel industry. Their boss tells them their firm is facing a tough time and is 
intending to reduce the cost of the next clothing collection to be launched by 20%. The 
respondents’ fictional character knows that, if s/he does not achieve such goal, s/he will not 
receive a desired promotion. Respondents are also told they had started a bidding process to 
choose a foreign supplier for this new collection that their firm was launching and that their 
task is to choose one supplier among each choice set or “None”. 
The creation of supplier profiles with different attributes was intended to bring 
realism to the task, generating “natural noise” in the decision-making process (Aguinis & 
Bradley, 2014; Woehr & Lance, 1991). The supplier profiles contained different attributes 
related to cost, quality and delivery standards based on APICS (2011) guidelines for supplier 
selection. In addition, payment terms were added to supplier attributes, based on feedback 
during pilot testing. Each attribute was operationalized as low and high. Thus, there were 2! = 16 combinations of the four supplier attributes. However, instead of using a full 
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orthogonal factorial design, we reduced the total number of supplier profiles from 16 to 8, 
using a fractional orthogonal factorial design. The respondents’ choices were blocked in four 
different choice sets, containing two suppliers each. Because the use of fractional design and 
blocking can generate confounding effects, estimation of each attributes’ importance was 
limited to main effects. However, this was sufficient to test our hypotheses. 
3.3.2 Manipulations 
There were two levels of each manipulation: (1) position of the supplier in the supply 
chain (first- vs. second-tier supplier), and (2) conflict between institutional elements 
(existence or absence of it). Respondents were presented with one of the two levels of the 
position (between-subjects) manipulation and to both levels of the conflict (within-subjects) 
manipulation. After each manipulation, respondents answered four blocks of choice sets, for 
a total of 3 ∗ 4 = 12 decisions. The repeated measures after the level of conflict manipulation 
were compared. Respondents’ choices after the position manipulation were used as a practice 
trial, in order to avoid start-up effects, and were not considered in the analysis. Further, the 
setting was counterbalanced (Levin, 1998). Eight different versions of this experiment were 
created, combining one levels of position manipulation, one of the two different orders of the 
levels of conflict manipulation (AB or BA) and one of the two different orders of suppliers’ 
attributes (XY or YX). The orders of choice sets and suppliers were randomized. Figure 3 
presents how manipulations were presented to respondents. 
----------------------------------------------- Insert Figure 3 about here --------------------------------- 
In one level of the position manipulation, respondents were told they had asked 
suppliers not to outsource production because, as their firm was responsible for any problem 
suppliers had in their operations, they wanted to be able to easily inspect production facilities 
(1st tier supplier). In the other level, they were told they had asked suppliers to outsource 
production to smaller suppliers, which they knew were more difficult to inspect, yet they 
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believed would prevent their firm from being responsible for its suppliers’ outsourcing issues 
(2nd tier supplier). 
Conflicting institutional elements manipulation levels were based on practices of 
modern slavery similar to the Sumangali Scheme (Fair Labor Association & Solidaridad, 
2012) in the vignettes. Respondents were not explicitly told that a supplier’s practices were 
related to modern slavery, in order to avoid social desirability bias. In one level of the conflict 
manipulation, respondents were presented with suppliers that used some Sumangali Scheme 
practices, yet their institutional environment did not support them. In the other level of 
conflict manipulation, the supplier used Sumangali Scheme practices, but their institutional 
environment supported such practices. In both levels, the suppliers’ practices were counter to 
the firm’s sustainability practices represented by its Supplier Code of Conduct. Thus, in one 
level, there was no conflict between suppliers’ institutional environment and the respondent’s 
firm code of conduct, while in the other level, this conflict existed. The practices described in 
each level were different, in order to incentivize respondents to carefully read each of them. 
Based on feedback received during the pilot study recommending specification of the 
location where the suppliers were, we named the case of absence of conflict “Thailand” and 
the case of existence of conflict “Bangladesh”. Those names where selected without any 
intention to reflect the reality of institutional environments in Bangladesh and Thailand. The 
names and the descriptions of each institutional environment were strictly fictional, but added 
a limitation to this research, since respondents might have prior knowledge about these 
countries; however, without them respondents were not able to differentiate between the 
scenarios and the task seemed unrealistic to them. 
3.3.3 Pilot testing 
We asked seven purchasing managers, with significant work experience with supply 
chains and operations, to analyze the research instrument and give us feedback about it. Their 
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feedback caused multiple changes to our original design, in order to be more realistic, 
increase respondents’ involvement with the task and reduce respondents’ fatigue and 
boredom. The questionnaire was pilot tested several times using M-Turk (U.S. and India) and 
undergrad students (Brazil) and, following each iteration, we fine-tuned the research 
instrument, then tested it again. During the pilot test of the final design described here, we 
received positive feedback from many respondents, causing us to commence main 
experiment data collection. Table 1 lists the main changes made as a result of pilot testing. 
----------------------------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------------------------------- 
As part of pilot testing, we checked whether respondents understood the 
manipulations made, using manipulation checks. The manipulation check means were 
compared using independent (position manipulation) and dependent (conflict manipulation) t-
tests. On average, all samples could differentiate between the manipulations, except for the 
Brazil sample for the third item for position manipulation. This may be due to the use of 
undergraduate students for pilot test in Brazil. They may have been more honest in their 
answers than Brazil’s main experiment sample (managers), who might have intended to 
appear more politically correct on this item (Priem et al., 2011). As this was a problem in just 
one item out of nine manipulation checks, we assumed it was not a concern and kept the 
Brazil data without any exclusion. A summary of each sample’s performance on the 
manipulation checks is presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
------------------------------------------- Insert Table 2 and 3 about here ------------------------------- 
3.4 Moral identity and social desirability scales 
This research assessed respondents’ morality identity using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) 
moral identity scale. Its items were averaged, similar to other studies (e.g. Caldwell & 
Moberg, 2007; Brebels et al., 2011). Because of the ethical dilemma presented, we included a 
control variable to account for social desirability bias, using the original version of the 
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The post-
experimental section of the questionnaire included these scales, as well as general questions 
about the respondent’s demographics. 
3.5 Analysis 
The !′s for a discrete choice experiment can be estimated using different models, 
depending on the assumptions that are made about the distribution of !!" . We used a 
conditional logit model to solve for this assumption, making it possible to derive a closed-
form expression to represent the probability of respondent ! choosing alternative ! over !, ∀! ≠ ! (Train, 2002). Equation 3 presents this closed-form expression:  !!" = !"#(!∗ !)!!")!"# (!∗ !)!!")!                                                 (3) 
where: !!" = probability of respondent ! choosing alternative ! over ! ! = scale parameter for each coefficient, to reflect the unobserved portion of 
utility 
 
This closed-form expression makes logit models easier to estimate and interpret 
(Train, 2002). It also implies they must have a base alternative to refer to. We included 
“None” as the base alternative. Thus, our results can be understood as the probability of 
selecting a supplier in the presence of any valued attributes, rather than selecting the “None” 
alternative. Since all suppliers have violated the focal firm’s Supplier Code of Conduct, 
deciding to choose a supplier indicates that managers supported the suppliers’ violations. As 
a result, the higher the probability of choosing a supplier instead of choosing none is, the 
higher the probability of violating the firm’s sustainability practices.  
Logit modeling is restricted by its assumption that errors are independently distributed 
with normalized variance, which means that the error component of utility for alternative ! is 
not related to the error component of utility for another alternative !, ∀! ≠ ! (Train, 2002). 
This limits the application of logit models to situations where the error terms are not 
dependent. It is possible to indirectly test for this property, which we did by testing whether 
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or not our model held the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) property using the 
Hausman test (Hausman & McFadden, 1984). The IIA property of logit models is similar to 
the assumption of independent-error terms in least squares regression (McFadden et al., 1977) 
and, therefore, is a required condition for the application of conditional logit models. 
Another limitation derived from the assumption that logit errors are independently 
distributed with normalized variance is the confounding effect of the coefficients !∗ with the 
scale parameter ! (Allison, 1999; Train, 2002, p. 49). This implies that, if the random error 
components across groups are not equal, coefficient estimation can be biased and comparison 
across groups can indicate spurious differences where there are no differences in reality 
(Allison, 1999). Although potential confounding has been extensively recognized in the 
literature (Allison, 1999; Buis, 2016; Karlson et al., 2012; Mood, 2009; Swait & Louviere, 
1993; Williams, 2009), there is no consensus on how to deal with it. In order to avoid biasing 
our estimated coefficients, we created a separate model for each of the countries, which were 
expected to have different residual variation. The comparison across countries was, thus, 
limited to which variables were or were not statistically significant in each country’s sample. 
The size of each country’s coefficients was not compared, in order to avoid spurious 
conclusions resulting from differences in scale parameters, rather than true differences in 
causal relationships. On the other hand, different managers within a country were not 
expected to have different residual variation because of their random assignment to each level 
of position manipulation. 
Conditional logit models also imply that individual characteristics cannot enter the 
model, unless they are different over alternatives (Train, 2002). One way to account for those 
individual characteristics is to interact them with the attributes presented in each alternative. 
Individual characteristics, such as moral identity and the manipulations, interacted with the 
price attribute, which represents the respondents’ goal of reducing costs. Social desirability 
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was included in all interactions with moral identity because, if respondents have high moral 
identity, their responses should be honest, yet, if they have low moral identity, they could 
have biased their answers in order to present a positive image of themselves (Aquino & Reed, 
2002). In order to avoid multicollinearity due to the inclusion of such interactions, both moral 
identity and social desirability were mean-centered. VIFs were calculated and were all lower 
than 1.483. 
Dummy variables were created for suppliers’ attributes and manipulations. Rather 
than using the conventional dummy notation (0, 1) for the manipulation dummies, we 
identified them as (-1, 1), in order to avoid confounding them with the value of the “None” 
dummy. Thus, suppliers’ attributes dummies were:  low  = -1, “None”  = 0 and high  = 1. The 
manipulation dummies for position and conflict were 1st tier = -1, 2nd tier = 1, Conflict = -1 
and Absence = 1, respectively.  
3.6 Measurement equivalence 
Comparing responses from different cultures could potentially cause measurement 
equivalence problems. Semantic equivalence assumes that the words and structure used in the 
research instruments have the same meaning in different cultures. Conceptual equivalence 
assumes that a concept, independent of the words used to explain it, exists in different 
cultures. Finally, normative equivalence assumes that researchers should adapt to different 
societal practices in different cultures, in order to guarantee equivalent answers (Behling & 
Law, 2000). 
3.6.1 Semantic equivalence 
Semantic equivalence is guaranteed for the Indian sample, since the source language 
for our instruments was English. However, a few words using American spelling were 
adapted (e.g., “organization” adapted to “organisation”) to make it more natural for Indian 
respondents. For the Brazilian sample, one of the authors, who is fluent in English and a 
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native Portuguese speaker, prepared a Portuguese version of the research instruments. A 
native English speaker was hired to back-translate the Portuguese version to English, and 
both versions were compared and were found to be equivalent. It was not necessary to repeat 
this process, yet after the pilot test with Brazil sample we made two other small adjustments 
to Portuguese version: (1) the translation of the word “outsource” was changed to its literal 
description, to avoid ambiguous meanings in Portuguese; and (2) additional information 
about choice set instructions were added to the paper version in order to guarantee common 
understanding between paper and online versions. 
3.6.2 Conceptual equivalence 
Conceptual equivalence of the Portuguese and English versions was achieved using 
pre-existing validated translations for the moral identity (Rezende, 2015) and social 
desirability scales (Ribas Jr. et al., 2004). In addition, we conducted a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) of the moral identity scale using experimental data from all countries 
(Behling & Law, 2000). After removing two items from the original scales (moral 
internalization item 3 and moral symbolization item 4) because they had a low standardized 
regression weight (< 0.30) or had high cross-interactions with items of the other factor, the 
resulting CFA had satisfactory model fit indexes (!! = 156.835,!"#$/!! = 2.064,!"# =0.945 ,!"# = 0.942 ,!"# = 0.945 , !"#$% = .040)  indicating no conceptual equivalence 
issues. A test for model unidimensionality was also performed, and the model fit was better 
when considering the items as multidimensional, as described in the previous literature 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
3.6.3 Normative equivalence 
Normative equivalence issues are a potential concern because they are subtle, 
complex to identify, and difficult to deal with. Although some of these issues might have 
affected the results, we tried to minimize them by applying existing scales and existing 
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translations that had been tested in previous research, guaranteeing anonymity to respondents, 
and having native Brazilians (two of the researchers) analyze the translated research 
instrument (Behling & Law, 2000). 
4 Results 
4.1 Hypotheses test 
Table 4 presents the results of the conditional logit analysis by country. The 
McFadden’s R2 for all models was between 0.25 and 0.40, indicating excellent fit 
(McFadden, 1979, p. 307). Each model was tested for the IIA property using the Hausman 
test, failing to reject the null hypothesis in all cases (!!.!.! = 10.85 !!.!. = .547, !!"#$%&! =10.86 !!"#$%& = .541 and !!"#$%! = 11.62 !!"#$% = .474), which confirms that IIA holds for 
all countries, as well as the adequateness of conditional logit models for analyzing our data. 
----------------------------------------------- Insert Table 4 about here ---------------------------------- 
In order to test the hypotheses, the significant coefficients and their signs were 
interpreted. The higher a coefficient is, the higher the probability of selecting a supplier in the 
presence of that factor, compared to the probability of selecting “None.” H1 stated that 
suppliers’ non-compliance with the focal firm’s sustainability standards is higher in the face 
of conflicting institutional elements than in its absence. Conflict manipulation was only 
significant for the U.S. sample in its interaction with price (! = −.098 ! = .077). The 
coefficient for the U.S. sample for the interaction of price and conflict was ! = (−.098) ∗!"#$% ∗ !"#$%&'( , which resulted in !!"#$%&$ = −.098  and !!"#$%&'(& = .098 . In other 
words, for the U.S. sample, the probability of selecting a supplier instead “None” is higher 
when there is a conflict between institutional elements than there is not. As a result, H1 held 
for the U.S. sample, but did not hold for the Brazil and India samples. Thus, H1 was partially 
confirmed. 
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H2 stated that suppliers’ non-compliance with the focal firm’s sustainability standards 
would be higher for second-tier suppliers rather than for first-tier suppliers. The position 
manipulation interactions were significant in the U.S. and Brazil samples, but not in the India 
sample. For the U.S. sample, the interaction between price, moral identity and social 
desirability was significant (! = −.026 ! = .091). Although the coefficient size may seem 
small, it is important to recall that, because of its interaction with social desirability, which 
had a standard deviation of 6.093 in the U.S. sample, its actual value is higher and similar to 
other coefficient sizes. In order to interpret the coefficient sign of this interaction, we 
controlled for a low level of social desirability bias by considering social desirability score to 
be −1!" from mean, analogous to the treatment given to low levels of moral identity in the 
moral self literature (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Skarlicki & Van Jaarsveld, 2008; Winterich et 
al., 2013). The coefficient for the U.S. sample in the interaction of price, moral identity, 
position and social desirability (−1!" = −6.093) was ! = −.026 ∗ !"#$% ∗!"#$% !" ∗!"#$%$"& ∗ !"!_!"#$% , which resulted in !!!" = −.158 ∗!"#$% !"  and !!!" = .158 ∗!"#$% !". For the Brazil sample, position was significant in its interaction with price 
(! = −.108 ! = .051) and with price and moral identity (! = −.463 ! = .000). Thus, the 
coefficient for the Brazil sample for the interaction of price and position was ! = −.108 ∗!"#$% ∗ !"#$%$"&, which resulted in !!!" = .108 and !!!" = −.108, and the coefficient for 
the Brazil sample for the interaction of price, moral identity and position was ! = −.463 ∗!"#$% ∗!"#$% !" ∗ !"#$%$"& , which resulted in !!!" = .463 ∗!"#$% !"  and !!!" =−.463 ∗!"#$% !". Thus, H2 held only for the U.S. sample, because it did not hold for 
significant interactions with the position manipulation for the Brazil sample and was not 
significant for the India sample. H2 was partially confirmed. 
H3 stated that suppliers’ non-compliance with the focal firm’s sustainability standards 
would be higher if managers had low, rather than high, moral identity. Moral identity 
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interactions were significant for the U.S. and Brazil samples, but not for the India sample. For 
the U.S. sample, moral identity was significant in its interaction with price (! = −.272 ! = .003 ) and its interaction with price, position and social desirability (! = −.026 ! = 0.091). We controlled for the low level of social desirability bias in the U.S. sample 
(−1!" from mean). Additionally, we applied the same treatment given to moral identity 
interactions in the moral self literature (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Skarlicki & Van Jaarsveld, 
2008; Winterich et al., 2013), analyzing them at two levels of moral identity: low = −1!" 
from the mean and high = +1!" from the mean. The coefficients for the U.S. sample for the 
interaction of price and moral identity was ! = −.272 ∗ !"#$% ∗!"#$% !", which resulted in !!"#$% = .190  and !!"#!!" = −.190  and the coefficients for the U.S. sample for the 
interaction of price, moral identity (1!" = .70 ), position and social desirability was ! = −.026 ∗ !"#$% ∗!"#$% !" ∗ !"#$%$"& ∗ !"!_!"#$%, which, for the 1st tier, resulted in !!"#$% = 111 and !!"#!!" = −.111, and, for the 2nd tier resulted in !!"#$% = −.111 and !!"#!!" = .111. For the Brazil sample, the interaction between price, moral identity and 
position was significant (! = −.463 ! = .000). Consequently, the coefficient for the Brazil 
sample for the interaction of price, moral identity and position was ! = −.463 ∗ !"#$% ∗!"#$% !" ∗ !"#$%$"&, which, for the 1st tier of position manipulation, resulted in !!"#$% =−.258 and !!"#!!" = .258, and, for the 2nd tier, resulted in !!"#$% = −.258 and !!"#!!" =.258. Thus, because H3 held only for some significant interactions of moral identity in the 
U.S. and Brazil samples and did not hold for the India sample, H3 was partially confirmed. 
4.2 Valued attributes 
The respondents’ goal was represented by the low price attribute. Therefore, we 
expected price to be the most valued attribute in all samples, if managers chose a supplier 
rather than the “None” alternative. Other attributes should be valued as well, since we had 
included them to represent “natural noise”, but managers had no reason to prioritize them 
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over price. Empirical findings confirmed this expectation. The price attribute was significant, 
and the most valued attribute in all country samples. In addition, the quality attribute was also 
significant in all samples. The Brazil sample was the only one with significant values of lead 
time and payment terms. Although understanding the reasons why different cultures value 
different attributes is beyond the scope of this research, such results support the conclusion 
that quality, lead time and payment terms worked as “natural noise” in respondents’ choices. 
As a result, it is possible to assume that respondents felt the task to be similar to a lifelike 
situation (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014) and, consequently, their choices represented their actual 
behavior. 
4.3 Choice behavior 
According to H1 and H2, the main effects indicate the respondents’ probability of 
selecting a supplier to be lower in the “Absence” level of conflict and in the “1st tier” level of 
position. This effect should be the same, despite differences in respondents’ moral identity. 
Similarly, according to H3, respondents’ probability of selecting a supplier should be lower 
for those with higher moral identity, which should be the same despite the levels of conflict 
and position. Figure 4a represents expected respondents’ choice behavior in the presence of 
any valued attribute. Axis Y indicates the probability of selecting a supplier instead of 
“None,” and axis X indicates ascending values of moral identity. Comparing the expected 
results with each sample’s actual choice behavior clarifies how they did not follow the 
expected results. Actual choice behavior charts were built considering significant variables in 
Model 4 for each country. Choice behavior by country, in the presence of low price, is 
presented in Figures 4b-4d. 
---------------------------------------------- Insert Figure 4 about here ---------------------------------- 
Analyzing U.S. sample choice behavior in Figure 4b, the conflict effect was as 
expected for individuals within the same position level. This latter effect was moderated by 
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respondents’ moral identity. Respondents with “low” moral identity were more likely to 
select suppliers in the “1st tier” level, while respondents with “high” moral identity were more 
likely to select suppliers in the “2nd tier” level. Finally, the moral identity effect was different 
for each position level. The probability of selecting a supplier in the “2nd tier” was almost 
equal, despite respondents’ moral identity. Contrarily, in the “1st tier”, the moral identity 
effect decreased the probability of selecting a supplier.  
Analyzing sample choice behavior in the Brazil sample’s Figure 4c, the conflict 
effect was not significant, despite the differences in respondents’ moral identity levels. The 
position effect, however, was moderated by respondents’ moral identity. In contrast to the 
U.S. results, respondents with “low” moral identity were more likely to select suppliers in 
“2nd tier”, while respondents with “high” moral identity were more likely to select suppliers 
in “1st tier”. Further, the moral identity effect decreased the probability of selecting a supplier 
in the “2nd tier” as expected, but increased it in the “1st tier”. 
Finally, analyzing the India sample choice behavior in Figure 4d, the probability of 
choosing a supplier, instead of “None”, was equal in spite of the presence of conflicting 
institutional elements, the position of the suppliers in the supply chain and their level of 
moral identity. 
5 Discussion 
In general terms, the results indicate that: (1) respondents socialized in different 
cultures and institutional contexts had different types of non-compliant behavior, and (2) 
respondents with a “high” moral identity could violate their self-regulatory mechanisms 
under certain positions in the supply chain that presented similar – or in some cases higher – 
probabilities of selecting a supplier than respondents with low moral identity, such as the 
U.S. sample assessing suppliers in 2nd tier, the Brazil sample assessing suppliers in the 1st tier 
and, in the India sample, assessing suppliers in both positions. 
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5.1 Cultural and institutional differences in choice behavior 
The conclusion regarding respondents socialized in different cultural and institutional 
contexts presents different choice behaviors that can be explained, using social cognitive 
theory, by the fact that people construct their internal models, which regulate their behavior, 
based on their bidirectional interaction with their environment – which is, at least partially, 
constituted by their national culture – based on how they represent the environment in 
symbols, which is translated into courses of action and motivational factors for pursuing these 
courses of action (Bandura, 1999a). Not surprisingly, culture is seen as an antecedent to 
moral-self centrality and, consequently, to moral identity (Jennings et al., 2015). 
Another plausible explanation lies in the fact that only the U.S. sample significantly 
differentiated choice behavior in the presence of conflicting institutional elements. Because 
suppliers’ violations of the firm’s sustainability standards were related to the practices of 
modern slavery and because people interact with their immediate environment in developing 
their expectations about themselves, it may be reasonable to assume that people socialized 
under different institutional environments will have different choice behavior. As far as 
modern slavery practices are concerned, the U.S. institutional environment is stricter than 
Brazil’s and India’s institutional environments (Walk Free Foundation, 2016), which each 
contain several vulnerabilities that can make modern slavery practices socially acceptable, 
including weaker law enforcement, an overworked judicial system, corruption, higher social 
inequality, weaker government responses and strong informal economy.  
The empirical results indicate that managers socialized under stricter institutional 
environments are more aware of suppliers’ violations to the firm’s sustainability standards 
than managers socialized under more permissive institutional environments. 
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5.2 Moral disengagement mechanisms 
In different positions in the supply chain, we found that respondents with high moral 
identity violate their self-regulatory mechanism, with a similar – or in some cases higher – 
probability of selecting a supplier than respondents with low moral identity. According to 
social cognitive theory, people are expected to refrain from pursuing courses of action they 
anticipate will be self-censuring. People with high moral identity will self-regulate their 
actions to be in line with their expected self-efficacy of being a moral person (Bandura, 
1999a). Why, then, wasn’t this found in our empirical evidence? This may be the most 
intriguing finding. Although our theoretical proposition assumes managers to be consistent 
with their morality under any circumstances, the empirical evidence for all samples suggests 
the opposite. 
Social cognitive theory suggests that, once self-regulatory mechanisms are in place, 
they tend to be stable and moral agency is regulated, inhibiting people from acting 
inhumanely and empowering them to act humanely (Bandura, 1999a; 1999b). However, these 
self-regulatory mechanisms are neither fixed nor a constant “superego” overseeing one’s 
conduct. Rather, they operate only when they are activated, and social cognitive theory 
proposes different psychosocial maneuvers that can selectively deactivate those self-
regulatory mechanisms related to moral conduct. “Moral disengagement”, thus, is achieved 
by either “sanctifying” the reprehensible conduct, distorting its detrimental effects or 
disqualifying the victim of the mistreatment. These actions can be effective alone or 
combined. In some situations, a single action is sufficient for disengaging moral conduct, 
whereas in other situations, a combination of actions produces the same effect (Bandura, 
1986; 1991).  
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5.2.1 Moral justification and palliative comparison 
Moral justification and palliative comparison (or “advantageous comparison”) 
transform detrimental conduct into personally and socially accepted practices (Bandura, 
1999a). They do not rely on altering an individual’s personality structures or moral standards. 
Rather, moral justification finds endorsements for reprehensible behavior from within an 
individual’s current moral standards. Palliative comparison is based on contrasting the 
reprehensible behavior against an even worse criterion. After a behavior has been endorsed, 
people can then act inhumanely under a moral imperative, creating a self-conception of their 
actions supported by moral reasons. They do not see themselves “killing people”, for 
example, but rather they see themselves as “heroes” based on their morals (Bandura, 1999b). 
In our vignette, there are some cues that might have activated moral justification or 
palliative comparison mechanisms. The boss tells respondents that the firm is currently facing 
tough times and must reduce costs. Not reducing it may put their jobs at risk or even affect 
the firm’s future (moral justification). Selecting suppliers in developing countries, where 
social inequalities are huge, may promote overall social benefits (moral justification). Such 
poor, unqualified workers may have no other job opportunities, if the firm decides not to 
supply from them (palliative comparison). As a result, respondents are no longer “selecting 
non-compliant suppliers”. Rather they are concerned about the overall economic and social 
benefit from keeping their firm running. Similar situations may happen in real-life supply 
chains. 
5.2.2 Euphemistic labeling 
Euphemistic labeling is another way of disguising reprehensible conduct as personally 
and socially acceptable. It is achieved by euphemizing the symbolic representation of 
reprehensible conduct by giving it a smoothened symbol in people’s thoughts. People can 
then engage in reprehensible conduct, depending on what they call it (Bandura, 1999b; 2007).  
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In the case of our vignette, we did not explicitly indicate that suppliers used modern 
slavery practices, in order to avoid social desirability bias. However, this might have worked 
as euphemistic labeling. It is easier to select “a supplier not in compliance with your firm’s 
SCC” than a “supplier using modern slavery practices”. Similar euphemistic labeling may 
happen in real-life supply chains. Instead of endorsing modern slavery practices or inhumane 
work conditions in their supply chains, managers view themselves as pursuing lower costs, or 
they see cost increase as a barrier to implementing sustainable practices. 
5.2.3 Displacement and diffusion of responsibility 
Displacement and diffusion of responsibility allow people to not see themselves as the 
actual agent of their behavior. Displacement of responsibility addresses the responsibility for 
reprehensible conduct to a legitimate authority. Diffusion of responsibility blurs the 
responsibility for reprehensible conduct by splitting it between several agents. Both 
mechanisms act to sanctify reprehensible behavior and, at the same time, allow people to 
ignore the consequences of their conduct. When responsibility for reprehensible conduct is 
displaced to authorities, such authorities can implicitly authorize it by keeping obvious 
questions unasked to avoid revealing to themselves that they are authorizing reprehensible 
conduct (Bandura, 1999b). 
In our vignette, who was responsible for selecting non-compliant suppliers: the 
respondent, the respondents’ boss, the 1st tier supplier or the smaller suppliers hired by focal 
firm’s 1st tier supplier, in order to reduce costs? In a real-life supply chain, responsibility may 
be displaced and diffused to justify inhumane behavior. Suppliers’ managers may blame the 
firm for exerting cost reduction pressures, while the firm’s managers may displace 
responsibility to the suppliers’ managers who did not comply with their SCC or other 
certificates. In addition, the firm’s managers may avoid asking obvious questions in order to 
avoid the perception that they are authorizing reprehensible conduct. When a firm sells, for 
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instance, a football stitched in Pakistan at the price of US$100 in North America, its 
managers may avoid questioning what their Pakistani suppliers did in order to deliver the 
same football to their firm at a cost of around US$5 (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). 
Finally, the firm’s organizational structure may favor diffusion of responsibility, keeping the 
purchasing and corporate social responsibility departments apart, diffusing responsibility for 
suppliers’ non-compliance with SCCs across both departments (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 
2014). 
5.2.4 Minimizing, ignoring or misconstruing the consequences 
Minimizing, ignoring and misconstruing the consequences disengages moral conduct 
by keeping people distant from the suffering their conduct causes. The farther they are from 
the consequences of their actions, the more they will be inclined to minimize or ignore such 
consequences. Besides, when consciously pursuing harmful conduct because of personal self-
interest, people tend to ignore or minimize its consequences and keep themselves as far as 
they can from the results of their conduct (Bandura, 1999b).  
In our vignette, respondents were not directly informed of any harm their choices 
would generate, although they could have inferred it. As a result, they might have completely 
ignored the consequences of selecting a non-compliant supplier. Minimizing or ignoring the 
consequences may explain, for instance, why the U.S. sample preferred or were indifferent to 
suppliers whose conduct had consequences that took place far from their firm (in 2nd rather 
than the 1st tier). Similar effects may happen in real-life supply chains. Pursuing compliance 
with sustainability practices only in first-tier suppliers and avoiding increasing the visibility 
of other supply chain tiers may be an effective manner of preventing managers from 
acknowledging the inhumane consequences of their conduct. 
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5.2.5 Dehumanization and attribution of blame 
Dehumanization and attribution of blame mechanisms attempt to disqualify the victim 
of the maltreatment. Once the victims are disqualified or blamed, reprehensible conduct can 
be justified and excused. Dehumanization distorts victims’ human qualities, transforming 
then in subhuman objects. Attribution of blame allocates responsibility for the mistreatment 
to the victims or to the circumstances (Bandura, 1999b). Such mechanisms are less clear than 
the others in our vignette and in real-life supply chains contexts; thus, we do not discuss them 
further. 
6 Conclusions 
6.1 Limitations 
Experimental designs offer an excellent approach for understanding causal 
relationships, providing respondents with controlled manipulations that enhance internal 
validity, by minimizing alternative explanations for the results. On the other hand, they are 
limited in terms of external validity and, although we took several steps to minimize these 
limitations, it is not possible to address them completely. First, our sample may not represent 
the full range of American, Brazilian and Indian managers, considering the usage of M-Turk 
in the U.S. and India, which restricts data collection to “large samples of working individuals 
at relatively low cost” (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014), and data collection in Brazil only 
accounted for managers who were enrolled in graduate business courses in São Paulo state. 
Moreover, although the vignette is not unrealistic in a business context, all its nuances – the 
goal and the compensation to achieve it, the presence of a boss, the suppliers’ location, the 
“Sumangali Scheme” practices, and so on – limit the generalizability of our findings. Finally, 
even though we randomly assigned subjects to treatments and controlled for differences 
between respondents and omitted-variable bias, demand effects could still have existed, 
limiting generalization of our findings to the individual level. The repetition of similar 
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experiments with different samples, case studies and survey designs are ways to address such 
limitations. 
6.2 Final considerations 
In our intention to understand three causes of suppliers’ non-compliance with a firm’s 
sustainability standards in a supply chain, we found support for two unexpected results, 
which are not in contradiction with the theories they were based on. First, different cultural 
and institutional backgrounds may affect the way managers perceive suppliers’ non-
compliance with a focal firm’s sustainability standards, especially for those whose 
socialization processes occurred in more permissive institutional environments. Second, 
despite managers’ morality or culture, certain positions in the supply chain allow them to 
violate their self-regulatory mechanisms and act against focal firm’s sustainability policies.  
The exploratory nature of our findings provides an invitation for future research to 
explore new and important theoretical concepts, in order to enhance our comprehension of 
non-compliant behavior in supply chains. Exploring how socialization, under different 
cultural and institutional contexts, influences suppliers’ non-compliance with sustainability 
practices may contribute to approaching such practices more effectively in global supply 
chains. Testing moral disengagement mechanisms in a supply chain context may be 
enlightening in the creation of supply chain configurations that prevent managers from 
disengaging their morality. We also believe that greater application of social cognitive theory 
and discrete choice experiments to supply chain contexts can bring fruitful theoretical and 
methodological advancement to the understanding of SSCM dynamics. 
This research contributes to the SSCM literature, social cognitive theory and practice. 
It brings new insights to the SSCM literature by applying different theoretical approaches and 
discrete choice experimental methodology, in order to take a step forward to overcome the 
limitations of the coercion and collaboration paradigms for implementation of sustainability 
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practices in a supply chain. Second, despite the wide application of moral disengagement 
concepts (e.g.: Bandura, 1999; 2004; 2007; McAlister et al., 2006; Osofsky et al., 2005; 
White et al., 2009), this research extends social cognitive theory to application in supply 
chains. Finally, it contributes to practice by shedding light on the importance of national 
culture, institutional environments and position in a supply chain to engage managers’ 
compliance with sustainability practices in supply chains, which should help government, 
NGOs and corporate actors in organizing and managing sustainable supply chains that can 
enhance moral engagement and avoid inhumane behavior.  
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7 Appendix I – Research instrument 
Common Module 
 Now, please imagine yourself in the following situation: 
You’ve been working as a procurement manager for Premium Look for some time now. Premium Look is 
a global clothing brand, which is known worldwide. 
  
 “I have some bad news for you... We are facing tough times”, your boss said during your last meeting. As 
your department is responsible for bidding and selecting garment component suppliers, this year’s winter 
collection must cost around 20% less than the current collection. 
  
“Anyway, stay positive, my friend… I know you can do it”, your boss added. The conversation ended. 
  
You know that reducing 20% of the current cost seems impossible, and you are worried. Your dream to get 
a promotion soon will probably be frustrated if you do not achieve this target. But you don't like the idea 
of giving up on your dreams... 
 
Few days after, you started a bidding process with different foreign suppliers. You've also visited their 
operations and talked to some of their clients to better understand opportunities to reduce costs and achieve 
your target.  
 
Next, you are going to see some supplier profiles. Your task is to select which of them is the best supplier 
to provide the new winter collection to Premium Look in your opinion. 
 
Manipulation Module: Position in the Supply Chain  
 
Level: 1st tier 
 
Before you start, keep in mind that: 
1- All potential suppliers are from foreign countries and follow different laws. 
2- According to Premium Look's code of conduct, suppliers must offer good work conditions to its 
employees and fair wages. 
3- In order to reduce costs, you have asked potential suppliers not to outsource any part of production. You 
want to be able to easily inspect production facilities whenever it is necessary and if anything goes wrong, 
it is Premium Look’s responsibility to solve the problem. 
 
Level: 2nd tier Before you start, keep in mind that:  
1- All potential suppliers are from foreign countries and follow different laws. 
2- According to Premium Look's code of conduct, suppliers must offer good work conditions to its 
employees and fair wages. 
3- In order to reduce costs, you have asked potential suppliers to outsource production to smaller suppliers. 
These smaller suppliers are difficult to inspect, but if anything goes wrong, it is not your problem. You can 
argue Premium Look cannot be held responsible for its suppliers’ decision to outsource production. 
 
Manipulation Module: Conflict of institutional elements 
 
Level: 
Absence of 
conflict 
 
Now, imagine the suppliers you are assessing are located in Thailand. 
  
You know that supplier practices in this region may be against Premium Look's code of conduct, such as: 
(1) not being aware of employees’ health and safety issues, and (2) requesting employees to work 3-4 extra 
hours a day without paying a premium for it. 
  
Local population thinks such poor working conditions are unacceptable and does not want to have a job 
under such conditions. 
  
Moreover, Thai laws strictly prohibit such practices. 
 
Level: 
Existence of 
conflict 
Now, imagine the suppliers you are assessing are located in Bangladesh. 
  
You know that supplier practices in this region may be against Premium Look's code of conduct, such as: 
(1) requesting employees to have long working hours, with normal shift up to 12 hours, and (2) paying 
wages to workers far below the minimum wages. 
  
However, local population accepts such practices and thinks it is better to have a job under these 
conditions than having no job at all. 
  
Besides, such practices are in full compliance with Bangladeshi laws. 
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Manipulation Checks 
Item: 
 
Position 
manipulation 
According to what you have just read: 
 
1. You've asked suppliers to outsource production to smaller suppliers 
2. Because suppliers are not going to outsource production, it will be easy to inspect production facilities 
3. Premium Look cannot be held responsible for its suppliers’ outsourcing issues 
 
Conflict 
manipulation 
1. Suppliers' practices in Bangladesh/ Thailand are not in compliance with Premium Look’s code of 
conduct 
2. People in Bangladesh/Thailand accept to have a job under poor working conditions 
3. Suppliers in Bangladesh/Thailand offer working conditions to its employees that are prohibited by 
Bangladeshi/Thai law 
 
5-point Likert scale 
(1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree) 
 
Choice sets 
Item: 
 
Please select the best supplier in your opinion. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Block 1 Supplier A 
Price: $2.42 (-20% vs current price) – achieves 
target 
Quality: Superior 
Lead time: FOB – 30 days 
Payment terms: 45 days after delivery 
 
Supplier B 
Price: $2.72 (-10% vs current price) – does 
not achieve target 
Quality: Satisfactory 
Lead time: FOB – 60 days 
Payment terms: 15 days after order 
None 
Block 2 Supplier C 
Price: $2.72 (-10% vs current price) – does not 
achieve target 
Quality: Satisfactory 
Lead time: FOB – 30 days 
Payment terms: 45 days after delivery 
 
Supplier D 
Price: $2.42 (-20% vs current price) – 
achieves target 
Quality: Superior 
Lead time: FOB – 60 days 
Payment terms: 15 days after order 
None 
Block 3 Supplier E 
Price: $2.72 (-10% vs current price) – does not 
achieve target 
Quality: Superior 
Lead time: FOB – 30 days 
Payment terms: 15 days after order 
 
Supplier F 
Price: $2.42 (-20% vs current price) – 
achieves target 
Quality: Satisfactory 
Lead time: FOB – 60 days 
Payment terms: 45 days after delivery 
None 
Block 4 Supplier G 
Price: $2.42 (-20% vs current price) – achieves 
target 
Quality: Satisfactory 
Lead time: FOB – 30 days 
Payment terms: 15 days after order 
Supplier H 
Price: $2.72 (-10% vs current price) – does 
not achieve target 
Quality: Superior 
Lead time: FOB – 60 days 
Payment terms: 45 days after delivery 
 
None 
Post-experiment questionnaire 
 
 Familiarity: How familiar are you with procurement topics? 
5-point Likert scale 
(1= not at all familiar, 5= extremely familiar) 
Age: What is your age? 25 or less / 26-30 / 31-35 / 36-40 / More than 40 
Gender: What is your gender? Male / Female 
Experience: How many years of work experience do you have? 5 years or less / 6-10 years / 11-15 years / 
16-20 years / More than 20 years 
Job Title: What is your current job title? If you are not working at the moment, please select your last job 
title. Student, Researcher or Teacher / Assistant or Analyst / Manager or Director / Other 
Nationality: What is your nationality? American / Brazilian / Indian / Other 
Feedback: Please feel free to provide us any kind of feedback below about your opinion regarding this 
experiment. 
 
 
  
36 
8 References 
Aßländer, M. S., Roloff, J., & Nayir, D. Z. (2016). Supplier as Stewards? Managing Social Standards in 
First- and Second-Tier Suppliers. Journal of Business Ethics , 139, 661-683. 
Aguinis, H., & Bradley, K. J. (2014). Best Practice Recommendations for Designing and Implementing 
Experimental Vignette Methodology Studies. Organizational Research Methods , 17 (4), 351-371. 
Aiman-Smith, L., Scullen, S. E., & Barr, S. H. (2002). Conducting Studies of Decision Making in 
Organizational Contexts: A Tutorial for Policy-Capturing and Other Regression-Based Techniques. 
Methodological Resources , 5 (4), 388-414. 
Allison, P. D. (1999). Comparing Logit and Probit Coefficients Across Groups. Sociological Methods & 
Research , 28 (2), 186-208. 
Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston. 
APICS Foundation. (2011). APICS OMBOK Framework 39. Retrieved July 26, 2016, from APICS 
Operations Management Body of Knowledge Framework, Third Edition: 
http://www.apics.org/industry-content-research/publications/ombok/apics-ombok-framework-table-
of-contents/apics-ombok-framework-3.9 
Aquino, K., & Reed, A. I. (2002). The Self Importance of Moral Identity. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology , 83 (6), 1423-1440. 
Aquino, K., Reed, A. I., Freeman, D., Lim, V. K., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a Social-Cognitive Model of 
Moral Behavior: The Interactive Influence of Situations and Moral Identity Centrality. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology , 97 (1), 123-141. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. Prentice-Hall. 
__________. (1990). Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Terrorism. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of 
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: 
Cambridge Press University. 
__________. (1991). Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action. In W. M. Kurtines, & J. L. 
Gewirts (Eds.), Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development (pp. 45-103). Hillsdale, New Jersey, 
USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
__________. (1999b). Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review , 3, 193-209. 
__________. (1999a). A Social Cognitive Theory of Personality. In L. Pervin, & O. John (Eds.), Handbook 
of Personality (2nd ed., pp. 154-196). New York: Guilford Publications. 
__________. (2004). The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Courterterrorism. In F. 
M. Mogahaddam, & A. J. Marsella (Eds.), Understanding Terrorism: Psychologycal Roots, 
Consequences and Interventions (pp. 121-150). Washington, DC, USA: American Psychological 
Association Press. 
__________. (2005). The Evolution of Social Cognitive Theory. In K. G. Smith, & A. H. M. (Eds.), Great 
Minds in Management (pp. 9-35). Oxford: Oxford Press. 
  
37 
__________. (2007). Impeding Ecological Sustainability Through Selective Moral Disengagement. 
International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable Development , 2 (1), 8-35. 
Behling, O., & Law, K. S. (2000). Translating Questionnaires and Other Research Instruments: Problems 
and Solutions. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Bendoly, E., Donohue, K., & Schultz, K. L. (2006). Behavior in Operations Management: Assessing Recent 
Findings and Revisiting Old Assumptions. Journal of Operations Management , 24, 737-752. 
Brebels, L., Cremer, D. D., Dijke, M. V., & Hiel, A. V. (2011). Fairness as Social Responsability: A Moral 
Self-regulation Account of Procedural Justice Enactment. British Journal of Management , 22, S47-
S58. 
Buis, M. L. (2016). Logistic Regression: When Can We Do What We Think We Can Do? Working Paper. 
Available in: http://www.maartenbuis.nl/wp/odds_ratio_2.3.pdf. 
Caldwell, D. F., & Moberg, D. (2007). An Exploratory Investigation of the Effect of Ethical Culture in 
Activating Moral Imagination. Journal of Business Ethics , 73, 193-204. 
Carter, C. R., & Rogers, D. S. (2008). A Framework of Sustainable Supply Chain Management: Moving 
Toward New Theory. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 38 
(5), 360-387. 
Carter, C. R., & Easton, P. L. (2011). Sustainable Supply Chain Management: Evolution and Future 
Directions. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management , 41 (1), 46-62. 
Cattell, R. B. (1966). The Scientific Analysis of Personality . Chicago: Aldine. 
Croson, R., Schultz, K., Siemsen, E., & Yeo, M. L. (2013). Behavioral Operations: The State of the Field. 
Journal of Operations Management , 31, 1-5. 
Crowne, D., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A New Scale of Social Desirability Independent of Psycopathology. 
Journal of Consulting Psychology , 24 (4), 349-354. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review , 48, 147-160. 
Egels-Zandén, N. (2007). Supplier's Compliance with MNCs' Code of Conduct: Behind the Scenes at 
Chinese Toy Suppliers. Journal of Business Ethics , 75, 45-62. 
Elkington, J. (1997). Cannibal with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business. Capstone 
Publishing Ltd. Oxford. 
Fair Labor Association & Solidaridad. (2012). Research Report: Understanding the Characteristics of the 
Sumangali Scheme in Tamil Nadu Textile & Garment Industry and Supply Chain Linkages. 
Retrieved on July 26, 2016, from 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/understanding_sumangali_tamil_na du_0.pdf 
Freud, S. (1963). Introductory Lectures on Psychoanlaysis. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (J. Strachey, Trans., (First German edition 
published in 1917) ed., Vol. 15 and 16). London: Hogarth. 
_______. (1964). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Work of Sigmund Freud (J. Strachey, Trans., (First German edition 
published in 1933) ed., Vol. 22). London: Hogarth. 
  
38 
Gimenez, C., & Tachizawa, E. M. (2012). Extending Sustainability to Suppliers: A Systematic Literature 
Review. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal , 17 (5), 531-543. 
Grimm, J. H., Hofstetter, J. S., & Sarkis, J. (2014). Critical Factors for Sub-supplier Management: A 
Sustainable Food Supply Chains Perspective. International Journal of Production Economics , 152, 
159-173. 
Hausman, J., & McFadden, D. L. (1984). Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model. 
Econometrica , 52 (5), 1219-1240. 
Jennings, P. L., Mitchell, M. S., & Hannah, S. T. (2015). The Moral Self: A Review and Integration of the 
Literature . Journal of Organizational Behavior , 36, S104-S168. 
Jiang, B. (2009a). Implementing Supplier Codes of Conduct in Global Supply Chains: Process Explanations 
from Theoretic and Empirical Perspectives. Journal of Business Ethics , 85, 77-92. 
_______. (2009b). The Effects of Interorganizational Governance on Supplier’s Compliance with SCC: An 
Empirical Examination of Compliant and Non-Compliant Suppliers. Journal of Operations 
Management , 27, 267-280. 
Karlson, K. B., Holm, A., & Breen, R. (2012). Comparing Regression Coefficients Between Same-sample 
Nested Models Using Logit and Probit. Sociological Methodology , 42 (1), 286-313. 
Kim, S., Colicchia, C., & Menachof, D. (2016, July). Ethical Sourcing: An Analysis of the Literature and 
Implications for Future Research. Journal of Business Ethics , 1-20. 
Kirchoff, J. F., Omar, A., & Fugate, B. S. (2016, January). A Behavioral Theory of Sustainable Supply 
Chain Management Decision Making in Non-Exemplar Firms. Journal of Supply Chain 
Management , 41-65. 
Kumar, D., & Rahman, Z. (2015). Sustainability Adoption Through Buyer Supplier Relationship Across 
Supply Chain: A Literature Review and Conceptual Framework. International Strategic 
Management Review , 3, 110-127. 
Levin, I. P. (1998). Relating statistics and experimental design: an introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: 
Sage Publications, Inc. 
Louviere, J. J. (1984). Using Discrete Choice Experiments and Multinomial Logit Choice Models to 
Forecast Trial in a Competitive Retail Envionment: A Fast Food Restaurant Illustration. Journal of 
Retailing , 60 (4), 81-107. 
___________. (1988, January). Conjoint Analysis Modelling of Stated Preferences: A Review of Theory, 
Methods, Recent Developments and External Validity. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy , 
93-119. 
Lund-Thomsen, P., & Lindgreen, A. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Value Chains: Where 
Are We Now and Where Are We Going. Journal of Business Ethics , 123, 11-22. 
McAlister, A. L., Bandura, A., & Owen, S. V. (2006). Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of 
Military Force: The Impact of Sept. 11. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology , 25 (2), 141-165. 
McFadden, D. L. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In P. Zarembka, 
Frontiers in Econometrics (pp. 105-142). New York, NY, USA: Academic Press. 
  
39 
_____________. (1979). Quantitative Methods for Analysing Travel Behaviour of Individuals: Some Recent 
Developments. In D. A. Hensher, & P. R. Stopher (Eds.), Behavioural Travel Modeling (pp. 279-
318). London, UK: Groom Helm London. 
_____________. (2000, Dec 8). Economic Choices. Nobel Prize Lecture . Berkeley, CA, USA. 
McFadden, D. L., Train, K., & Tye, W. B. (1977). An Application of Diagnostic Tests for the Independence 
from Irrelevant Alternatives Property of the Multinomial Logit Model. Transportation Research 
Record (637) , 39-46. Transportation Research Board. 
Mena, C., Humphries, A., & Choi, T. Y. (2013). Toward a Theory of Multi-tier Supply Chain Management. 
Journal of Supply Chain Management , 49 (2), 58-77. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology , 83 (2), 340-363. 
Mood, C. (2009). Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can Do, and What We Can 
Do About It. European Sociological Review , 26 (1), 67-82. 
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic Response to Institutional Processes. Academy of Management Review , 16 (1), 
145-179. 
Osofsky, M. J., Bandura, A., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2005). The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution 
Process. Law and Human Behavior , 29 (4), 371-393. 
Porteous, A. H., Rammohan, S. V., & Lee, H. L. (2015, April 27). Carrots or Sticks? Improving Social and 
Environmental Compliance at Suppliers Through Incentives and Penalties. Production and 
Operations Management . 
Priem, R. L., Walters, B. A., & Li, S. (2011). Decisions, Decisions! How Judgment Policy Studies Can 
Integrate Macro and Micro Domains in Management Research. Journal of Management , 37 (2), 
553-580. 
Raaijmakers, A. G., Vermeulen, P. A., Meeus, M. T., & Zietsma, C. (2015). I Need Time! Exploring 
Pathways to Compliance under Institutional Complexity. Academy of Management Journal , 58 (1), 
85-110. 
Rezende, M. M. (2015, Dez). Evidências de Validade da Escala de Identidade Moral para o contexto 
brasileiro (Evidences of the Moral Identity Scale validity to Brazilian context). Unpublished master 
thesis. Available in: http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/19932. 
Ribas Jr., R. d., de Moura, M. S., & Hutz, C. S. (2004). Adaptação brasileira da Escala de Desejabilidade 
Social de Marlowe-Crowne (Brazilian adaptation of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale). 
Avaliação Psicológica , 3 (2), 83-92. 
Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and Organizations (2nd edition ed.). Thousand Oaks, California, US: Sage 
Publications. 
__________. (2008). Approaching adulthood: the maturing of institutional theory. Theory and Society , 37 
(5), 427-442. 
Scott, W. R., & Meyer, J. W. (1983). The organization of societal sectors. In W. R. Scott, & J. W. Meyer, 
Organizational environments: ritual and rationality. Beverly Hills, CA, USA: Sage. 
  
40 
Skarlicki, D. P., & Van Jaarsveld, D. D. (2008). Getting Even for Customer Mistreatment: The Role of 
Moral Identity in the Relationship Between Customer Interpersonal Injustice and Employee 
Sabotage. Journal of Applied Psychology , 93 (6), 1335-1347. 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. 
___________. (1969). Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts. 
Train, K. (2002). Discrete Choice Models with Simulation. Cambrigde University Press. 
Vachon, S., & Klassen, R. D. (2008). Environmental Management and Manufacturing Performance: The 
Role of Collaboration in the Supply Chain. International Journal of Production Economics , 111 
(2), 299-315. 
Walk Free Foundation. (2016). The Global Slavery Index. Retrieved July 25, 2016, from 
http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/index/ 
White, J., Bandura, A., & Bero, L. A. (2009). Moral Disengagement in the Corporate World. Accountability 
in Research , 16, 41-74. 
Wilhelm, M. M., Blome, C., Bhakoo, V., & Paulraj, A. (2016). Sustainability in Multi-tier Supply Chains: 
Understanding the Double Agency Role of the First-tier Supplier. Journal of Operations 
Management , 41, 42-60. 
Williams, R. (2009). Using Heterogeneous Choice Models to Compare Logit and Probit Coefficients Across 
Groups. Sociological Methods & Research , 37 (4), 531-559. 
Winterich, K. P., Mittal, V., & Aquino, K. (2013). When Does Recognition Increase Charitable Behavior? 
Toward A Moral Identity-Based Model. Journal of Marketing , 77 (3), 121-134. 
Woehr, D. J., & Lance, C. E. (1991). Paper People versus Direct Observation: An Empirical Examination of 
Laboratory Methodologies. Journal of Organizational Behavior , 12, 387-397. 
 
  
  
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Conceptual framework of research hypotheses 
 
 
Figure 2 – Triadic reciprocal causation 
Source: Bandura, 1986 (p. 24) 
 
 
Figure 3 – Manipulations and repeated measures flow 
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